Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Independent Agencies in the United States—Law, Structure, and Politics by Karmel, Roberta S.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 65 
Issue 4 Summer 2016 Article 11 
9-19-2016 
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Independent Agencies in the 
United States—Law, Structure, and Politics 
Roberta S. Karmel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roberta S. Karmel, Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Independent Agencies in the United States—Law, 
Structure, and Politics, 65 Cath. U. L. Rev. 873 (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol65/iss4/11 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Independent Agencies in the United 
States—Law, Structure, and Politics 
Cover Page Footnote 
Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center for the 
Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a former Commissioner of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. A research stipend from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in 
the preparation of this article. 
This book review is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol65/iss4/11 
  
873 
MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, 
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES—LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 
Roberta S. Karmel+ 
This book is an elegant and comprehensive analysis of federal independent 
regulatory agencies.  My own lens on the independent agencies in the federal 
system comes from my experiences as a staff member of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) from 1962–1969, and then a commissioner from 
1977–1980.  I was a director of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. from 1983–
1989 and then a member of the National Adjudicatory Council of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (now the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, also known as “FINRA”), so I also view securities regulation from 
the perspective of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”).  The authors had 
gained experiences in other sectors of the government, and so their viewpoints 
are a bit different from my own.  Those differences made for interesting reading 
on my part, and some objections to their analysis.  However, the authors and I 
are all academics, and similarly interested in the history, operation, and future 
of independent federal agencies. 
At times this book fails to adequately distinguish between executive branch 
agencies and classic independent agencies, such as the SEC.  This is not 
surprising because, as the authors concede in their final chapter, “[t]he 
administrative process owes more to history and experience than to doctrine.”1  
Very generally, the authors view the President and the Congress as engaged in a 
tug of war over the independent agencies.2  This is a valid framework, except 
that it has greater validity during periods when the executive and legislative 
branches of government are controlled by different political parties, with 
different perspectives on the utility and purposes of federal regulation.  This was 
not as true when I was a commissioner and President Carter and the 
congressional oversight committees for the SEC were basically in agreement on 
the SEC’s mission and operations.  Further, viewing control of independent 
agencies as a grand constitutional power struggle fails adequately to address the 
                                                            
 +  Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center 
for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School.  She is a former 
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 1. MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 395 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015). 
 2. See id. at 16. 
874 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:873 
politicization of agencies due to partisan congressional influence and oversight.3  
The authors also do not address how congressional influence results in agency 
capture, which undermines an agency’s mission.  The authors concede that “a 
substantial body of the Republican Party is determined to reduce the role and 
scope of government in the American economy . . . [and] should they succeed, 
the impact on the independent agency forum will be significant.”4 
Two great strengths of this book are the extensive and authoritative footnotes 
(happily on each page for easy reference) and the appendices on agency 
characteristics; comparisons of multi-member and other agencies;5 cases, 
statutes, bills and reorganization plans;6 and an index and bibliography.7  All of 
these materials make this book a useful research tool, and should be helpful to 
academics and others interested in understanding federal agencies. 
Chapter Two of the book traces the origins of independent agencies, using the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as a template, as the ICC is commonly 
considered the first independent federal regulatory agency.8  Other agencies 
discussed are the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, 
the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.9  Each is a 
multi-member agency, each is in some ways like the ICC but also different, and 
as the authors note, their “creation reveals a considerable degree of pragmatic 
development and evolution.”10  Although independence and non-partisanship 
were both values in their creation, a greater value was expertise.  In today’s 
complicated, technologically advanced world, expertise is probably needed 
more than ever in regulation, but populists on the right and left tend to debunk 
expertise and it does not seem to be as valued as it was by those who created the 
ICC and other independent agencies. 
Chapter Three on “Theories of Agency Independence” sets forth the authors’ 
view on how efforts to centralize administrative power in a unitary executive 
and congressional pushback has affected agency independence, but has not met 
with any consistent Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of 
independent agencies or intellectual theories on how independent agencies 
                                                            
 3. See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and 
Distributive Politics 11 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 539, 
2010). The authors in their last chapter acknowledge that “Congress, perhaps more than the 
president, is now a primary influence on most independent agencies.”  BREGER & EDLES, supra 
note 1, at 382. 
 4. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 392, 394. 
 5. Id. at 463–64. 
 6. Id. at 465–99. 
 7. Id. at 501–62. 
 8. Id. at 19–36.  Actually, an agency supervising boilers on steamships, which were 
frequently blowing up and killing passengers, was the first federal regulatory agency, and it was 
housed in the Treasury Department.  See Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61. 
 9. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 37–55. 
 10. Id. at 56. 
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should be organized.11  In Chapter Four, on agency structure and appointments, 
the authors discuss the few cases where the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether agency members enjoy freedom from firing by the President once 
appointed by him, with the advice and consent of the Senate.12  In these chapters 
and elsewhere, the authors view agency independence as a matter of 
independence from the President.  The authors hardly discuss agency 
independence from Congress.  Although the authors explain that the statutory 
composition of  multi-member agencies is designed to eliminate partisan 
decision-making, there is little focus on whether today’s agencies are non-
partisan. 
In the current highly divisive and partisan world of the Obama 
Administration, nominated members of the SEC other than the Chair have been 
paired as Democratic and Republican commissioners—many of whom have a 
background from the congressional committees that have oversight over the 
SEC.13  Neither the SEC Chair nor the President seems to enjoy the freedom to 
choose non-partisan candidates who will be confirmed by the Senate.14  
Qualifications are based on ideological correctness rather than expertise.15  This 
has led to very contentious and partisan decision making with many 3-2 
                                                            
 11. Id. at 59–85. 
 12. See id. at 87–132. 
 13. See Robert Schmidt & Dave Michaels, Ex-Senate Aide Said to Be Leading Candidate for 
SEC Seat, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 3, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
06-03/ex-banking-panel-aide-said-to-be-leading-candidate-for-sec-seat. 
 14. See id.  President Obama’s first choice of a Democratic commissioner to replace 
Commissioner Aguilar was torpedoed by Senator Elizabeth Warren because he came from a private 
law firm.  E.g., David Dayen, Obama Names Lisa Fairfax to SEC, a Vote for Wall Street Reform, 
THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 20, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/10/20/obama-names-lisa-
fairfax-to-sec-a-vote-for-wall-street-reform/.  Many stellar previous SEC commissioners had such 
a background in the past, and because they were experts and they left their clients at the door, they 
were able to make significant contributions to the development of securities regulation.  These 
commissioners include: Ray Garrett, Frank Wheat, Richard Smith, and Al Sommer.  See Ray 
Garrett Jr., 59, Dies, Former SEC Chairman, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1980, at C4; Wolfgang Saxon, 
Frank Wheat, 79, of S.E.C. And California Desert Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2000, at A11; N.Y 
Attorney Chosen To Be Member of SEC, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1967, at A5; Claudia Levy, A.A. 
Sommer Jr., 77, Dies; Lawyer Spurred SEC Reforms in ‘70s, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at B7.  
Recent Republican commissioners, including Kathleen Casey, and the nominee Hester Peirce, have 
worked for Senator Richard Shelby.  See SEC Biography: Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/casey.htm (last updated Mar. 17, 2008); see also Schmidt 
& Michaels, supra note 13.  When William Proxmire was head of the Senate Banking Committee, 
he preferred the appointment of persons with prior experience on the SEC Staff.  See Jack Egan, 
Senate Banking Committee Approves Garrett for SEC, WASH. POST, Jul. 27, 1973, at D10.  In my 
opinion, while a background in government is useful, an agency like the SEC needs some 
commissioners who have had real world experience in the securities industry or the private practice 
of securities law. 
 15. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., How partisan politics have poisoned the SEC, INVESTMENT NEWS 
(May 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150510/REG/150509926/ 
how-partisan- politics-have-poisoned-the-sec. 
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decisions on important issues.  Moreover, the selection of commissioners in this 
manner results in strong dissents designed to enable affected constituencies to 
appeal rulemaking to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit and prevail by upending new regulations.16  As discussed by 
the authors, this kind of partisanship has been a historical hallmark of the 
National Labor Relations Board, where labor and management commissioners 
are often at odds.  It was not traditionally the case at the SEC where the agency’s 
mission is to police the securities markets and protect investors, and where 
influence by outside political forces has been rare.17  In my opinion, this kind of 
partisanship has undermined the SEC’s mission and credibility and made it very 
difficult for the SEC to complete rulemaking mandated by statute.18  When the 
agency operated in a collegial manner, I believe it was much more effective and 
respected. 
In Chapter Four the authors discuss the appointments process, including 
recess appointments and paired appointments.19  The creation of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as an idiosyncratic agency 
(which, according to Congress, is neither a government nor private enterprise 
organization), and its attack under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, 
                                                            
 16. See id.; see also, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363–65, 373 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 17. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 46–47; see also What We Do, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated June 10, 2013); Schoeff, supra note 15. 
 18. It took five years for the SEC to complete the bulk of mandated rulemaking under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, in part because Republicans in the 
Congress and at the SEC objected to many of the statutory provisions.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Dodd-Frank Progress Report: Fourth Quarter 2015, DAVIS 
POLK, http://prod.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Q4_2015_Dodd-Frank_Progress_Report.pdf 
(last modified Dec. 31, 2015) (reporting that as of December 31, 2015, only 63 of the 94 mandated 
rulemakings had been finalized by the SEC); Marcus Baram, Dodd-Frank One Year Later: Slow 
Progress On Rules Amid Industry And GOP Onslaught, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 22, 2011, 9:22 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/dodd-frank-one-year-later_n_904391.html; 
Josh Boak, Wall Street reform law bogged down, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2011, 11:04 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/10/wall-street-reform-law-bogged-down-067192 (discussing 
the slow progress of reform under the Dodd-Frank Act, and the wishes of Republicans to dismantle 
the law entirely).  In the meantime, Congress passed the JOBS Act, which mandated new 
deregulatory rules, and again the SEC was slow to pass rules implementing this law.  See Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.); Ben Goad, Lawmakers fuming as jobs law ‘disappears into the 
bureaucracy’, THE HILL (June 9, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/legislation/304299-
lawmakers-fume-as-jobs-law-disappears-into-the-bureaucracy; Ross Kenneth Urken, Amidst 
Employment Anxiety, Are the JOBS Act Haters Justified?, MAINSTREET (May 1, 2013, 6:55 AM), 
https://www.mainstreet.com/article/amidst-employment-anxiety-are-jobs-act-haters-justified-0. 
 19. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 119–30. 
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which it barely survived, is discussed from a constitutional law perspective.20  
However, the politics behind the creation of the PCAOB and the congressional 
effort to protect oversight of the accounting profession from industry capture 
after the 2008 economic meltdown, is not discussed.  While I can appreciate the 
authors’ efforts to be high-minded and theoretical in their approach, I do not 
believe the controversy and litigation surrounding some of the independent 
agencies, like the PCAOB, can be divorced from raw political decision making. 
Chapter Five discusses the restriction on the President’s power to remove 
agency members from office only for “cause” as a key to agency independence.21  
While such tenure has long been considered a key feature of agency 
independence by academics, I believe that two other earmarks of independence 
discussed in Chapter Six—agency control of its own litigation and independent 
funding—are more important as a practical matter.22  If the SEC did not have 
the ability to sue anyone the agency believes has violated the securities laws—
including high level political appointees and members of Congress—it would 
not be as independent as the SEC is today.23  For example, the effort by the 
Nixon Administration to quash the SEC’s case against Robert Vesco was one of 
the Watergate scandals, which led to the resignation of an SEC Chair.24  When 
I was an SEC Commissioner, this event resulted in a preoccupation with 
affirming agency independence from the President, but not the Congress.25 
In my opinion, independent funding is a key to such agency independence as 
enjoyed by the Federal Reserve Board.  Although the SEC takes more money 
into the U.S. Treasury than its budget, from registration fees and fines, the SEC 
budget is subject to annual appropriations by the Congress.26  Serious efforts to 
insulate the SEC from partisan and Wall Street interference by giving the agency 
independent funding authority floundered in Dodd-Frank.27  Currently, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s budget is being pared down because 
                                                            
 20. Id. at 109–18.  See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: 
The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1023–24 (2005). 
 21. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 133–61. 
 22. Id. at 167–75. 
 23. When I was a commissioner of the SEC, the SEC and the Comptroller of the Currency 
brought an action against Bert Lance, President Carter’s Director of OMB.  See SEC v. Nat’l Bank 
of Ga., 1978 WL 1081, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 1978). Currently the SEC is investigating whether 
members of Congress or staffers violated the STOCK Act by trading on inside information.  See 
SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Reps., No. 14 Misc. 193 (PGG), 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 154302, at *29–33 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015) (subpoena enforcement case). 
 24. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 66–67 (1982). 
 25. See id.; see also BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 16. 
 26. See Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC’s Budget and Organization, 244 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2010, 
at 3, 3–4. 
 27. See id. at 3–4. 
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of a dispute between the Chair and the head of the agency’s oversight committee 
in Congress.28 
The authors of INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES view 
Congressional efforts to control agencies as part of the tension between 
autonomy and accountability, the topic of Chapter Seven, but they do not delve 
into the question of to whom agencies should be accountable.29  Voters do not 
elect the members of the agencies, but each agency has a statutory mission, and 
most of them have regulatory responsibilities.30 Accountability to Congress 
unfortunately often means accountability to regulated industries and others who 
fund congressional election campaigns, instead of accountability to the 
constituencies that the agencies were created to serve.31  Court review of agency 
action is, in my opinion, a more measured and more important accountability 
mechanism.  Although the authors discuss a great many cases in their book, they 
do not treat judicial review as an influence on how agencies function and the 
extent of their independence. 
Chapter Six also discusses how agency focus on independence led to 
Presidential efforts to centralize authority over agency rulemaking through 
reviews by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).32  OIRA’s 
creation and continued viability is related to some extent to the law and 
economics reform deregulatory idea of a cost/benefit analysis for all new agency 
rules.33  Congress, however, does not make any such calculation in its statutory 
mandates for the creation of new regulations, a problem that can lead to some 
interesting judicial challenges.34 
Chapter Eight reviews the outsourcing of governmental functions to the 
private sector, including government constraints and constitutional obligations 
on certain private sector organizations.35  Among the topics in this chapter is 
supervised self-regulation in the securities industry.36  This chapter is not strictly 
speaking about independent agencies at all, but as government outsources more 
                                                            
 28. See Daniel Siegal, CFTC Chair Slams Congress For Denying Budget Bump, LAW 360 
(Dec. 21, 2015, 8:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/740471/cftc-chair-slams-congress-for-
denying-budget-bump. 
 29. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 195–247; see also Ralph S. Tyler & Karen Stakem 
Homig, Administrative Law: Rules to Results, 44 MD. B.J., May/June 2011, at 44, 46–47 (noting 
that administrative agencies are accountable to the judiciary and the legislature). 
 30. See Tyler & Homig, supra note 29, at 45; see also, e.g., BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, 
at 197 (discussing that the President appoints the members of agencies with Senate confirmation 
through the example of the Assassination Records Review Board). 
 31. See, e.g., Catherine E. Bill, FCC v. Fox: Has the Supreme Court Sanctioned Political 
Influence in Agency Decision-Making?, 61 MERCER L. REV. 643, 658–60 (2010). 
 32. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 176–77. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363–65 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 35. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 249–87. 
 36. Id. at 282–86. 
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and more of its regulatory and other functions to the private sector, it is 
interesting and informative.37  These private sector bodies exercising 
governmental functions can be viewed as independent actors and they raise 
serious issues as to their accountability.38 
Chapter Nine reviews how multi-member agencies function and how the 
responsibilities of the agency Chair vis-à-vis its other commissioners affect 
internal agency operations.39  The chapter has interesting examples of different 
traditions and compromises that different agencies utilize.40  The authors also 
consider the inhibiting effect of the Sunshine Act on agency decision-making.41 
The authors discuss independent agencies in Europe in Chapter Ten.42  This 
chapter is necessarily cursory.  It does not analyze how independence in a 
parliamentary system is different from independence in the U.S. system, or the 
extent to which the European Union system is fundamentally different from 
either since it is an organization of nation states.  The authors suggest that there 
is an opportunity for more research on independent agencies abroad.43  I would 
suggest that an analysis of the securities commissions might be particularly of 
interest.  Theoretically, these specific agencies are supposed to be independent.44  
While these agencies are often housed within the Finance Ministry, they are 
sometimes free standing.45  Also touched on, but not fully developed in Chapter 
Ten, is the influence of international bodies, like the Bank for International 
Settlements and the Basle Committee, on national financial regulation.46 
In conclusion, in Chapter Eleven the authors speculate on the future of the 
independent agency.47  The authors refer to efforts by the executive branch to 
centralize power, as discussed in Chapter Six, over federal agencies and 
                                                            
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 272–77. 
 39. Id. at 289–351. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 316–24. 
 42. Id. at 353–79. 
 43. E.g., id. at 378–79 (discussing how the “emergence of an interdependent world” will 
change our understanding of European agencies, thereby requiring additional research). 
 44. Id. at 354.  The International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) 
recommends that securities regulators “should be operationally independent from external political 
or commercial interference in the exercise of its functions and powers and accountable in the use 
of its powers and resources.” INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 10 (2003), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154. 
pdf. 
 45. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 353–54; see, e.g., Directorates-General, FEDERAL 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/EN/About/Directorates-
General/directorates-general.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (demonstrating that the Ministry of 
Finance in Germany houses the department that deals with securities regulation). 
 46. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 375–76. 
 47. Id. at 381–96. 
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congressional push back.48  The authors wonder whether the Tea Party’s effort 
to destroy, or at least seriously curtail federal government regulation, will 
change the nature of the independent agencies.49  I think the answer is: no.  Some 
agencies have been abolished by reformers, and the book does tell the story of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board’s demise.  But many of its functions were then 
transferred to other agencies.50  All of the independent agencies were established 
to fill a need for regulation or service, and they are too entrenched in our system 
of government to be abolished.51 
It can be anticipated, therefore, that INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES will continue to be read and referred to as a valuable book about the 
creation and operation of independent federal regulatory agencies in the federal 
system.  Although my own career has involved the study and practice of 
administrative law, in and out of the government, I learned a great deal from this 
book, and despite the quibbles expressed in this review, I found it well-written, 
well-researched, and fairly balanced. 
 
                                                            
 48. Id. at 385–94. 
 49. Id. at 392–94. 
 50. Id. at 222–23. 
 51. Id. at 1–8, 222–23. 
